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Abstract
We re-examine the reduction of Maurer and Wolf of the Dis-
crete Logarithm problem to the Diffie–Hellman problem. We
give a precise estimate for the number of operations required
in the reduction and use this to estimate the exact security
of the elliptic curve variant of the Diffie–Hellman protocol for
various elliptic curves defined in standards.
1. Introduction
One of the oldest challenging problems in public key cryptography is to prove
or disprove that the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) and the Diffie-Hellman
Problem (DHP) are computationally equivalent. The hard part of the equivalence is
showing that we can solve the DLP using a polynomial number of group operations
and calls to a function which solves the DHP.
Significant steps have already been made towards the solution and the equiv-
alence has been proved for some groups. Intuitively, it makes sense to use such
groups for the Diffie–Hellman protocol (if of course no discrete logarithm algorithm
is known for them), so that breaking the Diffie–Hellman protocol is as hard as
computing logarithms, that is to say secure.
For most groups in use in cryptography, it is believed that the DHP and the
DLP are equivalent in a complexity-theoretic sense; i.e. there is a polynomial time
reduction of one problem to the other, and vice versa. Examples of groups that have
been proposed for application in the Diffie-Hellman protocol are the multiplicative
group of large finite fields (prime fields or extension fields), the multiplicative group
of residues modulo a composite number, elliptic curves over finite fields, and the
class group of imaginary quadratic fields.
Maurer and Wolf [6, 8, 7, 10] proved that for every group G with prime order p,
the equivalence holds if we are able to find an elliptic curve over Fp with smooth
order. The aim of this paper is to show that for various elliptic curve groups rec-
ommended by standards, such an elliptic curve exists. To this end, we will use the
technique of complex multiplication to construct elliptic curves with smooth or-
der. The implementation of this algorithm has been carried out using the software
package Magma.
2. Notation and Definitions
Formally we define the DHP and DLP as follows:
.
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DHP and DLP
Definition 1. Let G be a finite cyclic group generated by g. The problem of com-
puting from h ∈ G an integer x such that gx = h is called the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) with respect to g.
Definition 2. Let G be a finite cyclic group generated by g. The problem of com-
puting gab from ga and gb is called the Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP) with respect
to g.
It is easy to see that if one can solve the DLP, one can solve the DHP. Let ga and
gb be in G. We compute a from ga and compute (gb)a = gab. Hence DLP ⇒ DHP .
This paper focuses on the reverse reduction, namely DLP ⇐ DHP .
The equivalence we are interested in is a computational equivalence. Suppose
that one day, the DHP turns out to be easy, i.e. a given instance of this problem
can be solved in a reasonable time. We want to known if this implies that the DLP
is easy as well, i.e. if there exists an effective algorithm for solving a given instance
of the DLP by using a “small” number of operations and of calls to a function which
solves the DHP. Such a function is called a DH-oracle:
Definition 3. A DH-oracle takes as input elements ga and gb and returns gab.
Now, what do we mean by a “small” number of operations and a “small” number
of calls to the DH-oracle? The answer is a polynomial in log p, where p is the order
of the group.
Definition 4. Let G be a finite cyclic group with generator g of order |G| = p.
Given h ∈ G, the DLP and the DHP are computationally equivalent if we are able
to find the unique x modulo p such that h = gx, by using only:
• O ((log p)O(1)) operations in G,
• O ((log p)O(1)) calls to the DH-oracle.
For given elliptic curves defined in various standards we would like to show that
the number of group operations and DH-oracle calls required to reduce the DLP
to the DHP is small, i.e. less than say 2n1 . This would imply that if we believe
that no algorithm can solve the DLP in such groups in less than 2n2 operations
then any future algorithm for solving the DHP, and so breaking the DHP protocol,
would require 2n2−n1 operations. Hence, the smaller the value of n1, the tighter the
security reduction.
3. Algorithm Overview
We first give an overview of the method by Maurer and Wolf [6], which we shall
use in our later calculations.
Let G be a cyclic group with generator g and whose order is a prime p. If a is
an integer modulo p then the value of ga is said to be the implicit representation
of a. The idea of the algorithm is to do computations in implicit representation.
For example, to compute a + b (resp. a − b) in implicit form, we compute ga · gb
(resp. ga · (gb)−1) which costs only one multiplication (resp. and an inversion) in G.
To compute a · b in implicit form, one call to the DH-oracle is needed. To compute
a−1 in implicit form, one uses the fact that ap−1 = 1, so ap−2 = a−1. Hence, one can
perform any algebraic algorithm on the implicit representation. The following table
sums up computations in implicit representation and their average complexities.
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Explicit form Implicit form Complexity
a+ b ga+b = ga · gb 1 multiplication in G
a− b ga−b = ga · (gb)−1 1 multiplication and 1 inversion in G





2 log p calls to the DH-oracle
The following result can be found in [6] and [10].
Theorem 1. Let G be a group. If each large prime factor p of |G| is single and
if for every such p a cyclic elliptic curve over Fp is known with smooth order then
breaking DHP and DLP are equivalent for G.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that G = 〈g〉 with |G| = p prime.
The elliptic curve E = Ea,b(p) with parameters a and b in Fp is the set
{(x, y) ∈ (Fp)2 | y2 = x3 + ax+ b} ∪ {O}.
By a theorem of Ru¨ck [11] we can always choose a curve E, of a given order, such
that E(Fp) is cyclic and generated by P .




can be computed from gx by O(log a+ log b) = O(log p) group operations and two
calls to the DH oracle for G. If z = x3 + ax + b is a quadratic residue mod p
(which can be tested efficiently), then a group element gy can be computed such
that y2 ≡ z ≡ x3 + ax + b mod p using an implicit version of the Tonelli-Shanks
algorithm [5].
If z is not a quadratic residue, gx can be replaced by gx+d for a random offset d
until z is a quadratic residue. Testing the quadratic residuosity of z modulo p can
be achieved with O(log p) applications to the DH-oracle, because z is a quadratic
residue modulo p if and only if z(p−1)/2 ≡ 1 mod p, that is if and only if gz(p−1)/2 = g.
To simplify the discussion we shall assume that z is a quadratic residue and that







with x, y ∈ Fp. The point Q = (x, y) is a point on the elliptic curve E. Since
|E| is assumed to be smooth, we can use an implicit version of the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm k of Q with respect to the generator P .
Computing [k]P explicitly finally gives us x, as the abscissa of the point [k]P .
For each prime factor q of |E| we proceed as follows. From (gx, gy) we compute
(gu, gv) such that




From the generator P of E, the points





are computed for i = 0, 1, . . . , q− 1, and from (ui, vi) we obtain the group elements
(gui , gvi). Since the point (u, v) has order q and Q = [k]P , we conclude that
(gu, gv) = (gui , gvi) ⇐⇒ k ≡ i (mod q) .
Similarly, k can be computed modulo the prime powers of the factorisation of |E|,
and hence modulo |E|. From k, we compute [k]P = Q, and then x simply is the
abscissa of the point Q.
If |E| is B-smooth, then the rough complexity of this method is
• O
(
B · (log p)2
)





calls to the DH-oracle for G.
A more accurate estimate of the complexities will be given later.
4. How long it takes to solve a given instance of the DLP
In this section, we want to find a precise estimate of how long it takes to solve
a given instance of the DLP, that means how many calls to the DH-oracle and
multiplications are required on average. We need to analyse precisely the method
sketched in Section 3.
Let G be a cyclic group with generator g and prime order p. Given h ∈ G,
we want to find the unique x modulo p such that h = gx. The generalization
with a composite order is possible, see Section 3, but is not necessary of practical
importance, since the orders of all the groups recommended by standards are prime.
We assume that the parameters a and b of a cyclic elliptic curve Ea,b(Fp) with







with fj = 1 and qj < B for j = 1, . . . , s. Actually, the generalization with fj > 1
is possible using the analogy with the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, but is not useful
because in practice the multiple factors of |E| will always be small in comparison
with the largest prime factor |E|. Therefore, we assume that |E| = ∏sj=1 qj where
all qj are not necessarily prime but are all less than the smoothness bound B.
4.1. Algorithm Overview
1. 1.1. Compute gx
3+ax+b = gz
1.2. [Test quadratic residuosity of z mod p]
Compute gz
(p−1)/2
and g and compare them. On equality, go to Step 2,
else replace x by x+ d for a random d and go to Step 1.1.
2. [Compute gy from gz = gy
2
using the algorithm of Tonelli and Shanks.]
Write p− 1 = 2e · w with w odd.
2.1. [Initialize] Set gs ← g, r ← e, gy ← gz(w−1)/2 , gb ← gzy2 , gy ← gzy.
2.2. [Find exponent] If gb ≡ 1 mod p, output gy and go to Step 3. Otherwise,
find the smallest m ≥ 1 such that g(b2m ) ≡ 1 mod p.
2.3. [Reduce exponent] Set gt ← g(s2r−m−1 ), gs ← gt2 , r ← m, gy ← gyt,
gb ← gbs and go to Step 2.2.
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3. Note Q := (x, y) is a point on E, however we only know the implicit repre-
sentation (gx, gy).
For j from 1 to s, do the following:




3.2. For i from 0 to qj − 1, do the following:
3.2.1. Compute (uji, vji) = i · |E|qj · P , where P is a generator of E.
3.2.2. Compute (guji , gvji)
3.2.3. Compare (guji , gvji) with (gui , gvi). On equality let kj := i and go
to next iteration in j (or to Step 4 if j = s).
4. 4.1. Compute k mod |E| such that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, k ≡ kj mod qj .
4.2. Compute k · P = Q. Then x mod p is the first abscissa of Q.
The standard binary exponentiation algorithm requires log2 k squares and on aver-
age 12 log2 k multiplications. We require this in two places:
• To compute gxk , given gx. Then, on average 32 log2 k calls to the DH-oracle
are needed.
• Given a point P on an elliptic curve, to compute kP = ∑ti=0 ki(2iP ). Then,
on average 12 log2 k additions of points and log2 k doublings are needed.
We now expand on the second of these subprocedures.
4.2. Explicit and Implicit Point Multiplications
4.2.1. Doubling a point on an elliptic curve
Let P = (x, y) and Q = 2P = (x′, y′). Then: λ =
3x2+a
2y
x′ = λ2 − 2x
y′ = λ · (x− x′)− y





that (x′, y′) = 2(x, y).
gλ = DH(DH(gx, gx) · gx2 · gx2 · ga, DHI(gy · gy))
gx
′
= DH(gλ, gλ) · g−x · g−x
gy
′
= DH(gλ, gx · g−x′) · g−y
Computing gλ requires 4 + 32 log2 a multiplications, two calls to the DH-oracle and





cations and three inversions in Fp, and two calls to the DH-oracle.
Finally, doubling a point on an elliptic curve requires:
In explicit form: Four multiplications and one inversion in Fp.
In implicit form: 8+ 32 log2 a multiplications and three inversions in Fp, four calls
to the DH-oracle and one DH-inversion.
1To compute g(z
−1) from gz , we use the fact that g(z
−1) = g(z
p−2) in Fp. It requires on average
(approximately) 3/2 · log2 p calls to the DH-oracle. We call this a DH-inversion, in contrast with
an inversion: computing g−z from gz .
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4.2.2. Adding two points on an elliptic curve
Let P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) and R = P +Q = (x3, y3). Then:
λ = y2−y1x2−x1
x3 = −x1 − x2 + λ2
y3 = λ · (x1 − x3)− y1
In implicit representation, we know (gx1 , gy1) and (gx2 , gy2), and we want to com-
pute (gx3 , gy3) such that (x3, y3) = (x1, y1) + (x2, y2). g
λ = DH(gy2 · g−y1 , DHI(gx2 · g−x1))
gx3 = g−x1 · g−x2 ·DH(gλ, gλ)
gy3 = DH(gλ, gx1 · g−x3) · g−y1
Finally, adding two points on an elliptic curve requires:
In explicit form: Three multiplications and one inversion in Fp.
In implicit form: Six multiplications and four inversions in Fp, three calls to the
DH-oracle and one DH-inversion.
Combining the above analyses we obtain that a scalar multiplication of a point on
a curve requires the following number of operations.
In explicit form: Given a point P on an elliptic curve, computing explicitly the
point kP requires on average:
• 112 log2 k multiplications in Fp.• 32 log2 k inversions in Fp.
In implicit form: Given (gx, gy), computing (gu, gv) such that (u, v) = k · (x, y)
requires on average:
• 11 log2 k + 32 log2 a multiplications in Fp (we compute ga only once).• 5 log2 k inversions in Fp.
• 112 log2 k calls to the DH-oracle.• 32 log2 k DH-inversions.
4.3. Complexity
We are now in a position to evaluate precisely the complexity of the algorithm
for reducing the DLP to the DHP.
Step 1
Step 1.1 : We compute gx
3+ax+b = gx
3
(gx)agb. This requires two calls to the
DH-oracle and 2 + 32 (log2 a+ log2 b) multiplications.
Step 1.2 : This step requires 3 log2
|G|






2 (log2 p− 1) calls to the DH-oracle.
The field Fp contains p+12 quadratic residues and
p−1
2 non-quadratic residues. Let ν
be the number of iterations for Step 1. The probability for having ν = k iterations
is:



























Hence Step 1 requires on average about:
• 4+3 log2 a+ 32 log2 b+ 92 log2 |G|p multiplications (gb and gh are computed only
once).
• 1 + 3 log2 p calls to the DH-oracle.
Step 2
Step 2.1 requires about 32 (log2 w − 1) + 3 = 32 (log2 w + 1) calls to the DH-oracle.
Steps 2.2 and 2.3 require r+ 2 calls to the DH-oracle for one iteration, and at most
e iterations are expected. Since r is always smaller than e, Steps 2.2 and 2.3 need
at most e · (e + 2) calls to the DH-oracle. We need to estimate e, the integer such
that p − 1 = 2e · w with w odd. It is easy to see that on average, since p is odd,














calls to the DH-oracle.
Step 3
Let j be fixed.
Step 3.1 Using results of Section 4.2, Step 3.1 requires on average, for each value
of j:
• 11 log2 |E|qj + 32 log2 a multiplications in Fp.
• 5 log2 |E|qj inversions in Fp.
• 112 log2 |E|qj calls to the DH-oracle.
• 32 log2 |E|qj DH-inversions.
Step 3.2 First we compute |E|qj ·P , before entering into the loop in i. This requires
on average 112 log2
|E|
qj




Step 3.2.1 We use the fact that (ui+1, vi+1) = (ui, vi) +
|E|
qj
· P . The cost is
one addition on E, that is three multiplications and one inversion in Fp.
Step 3.2.2 This step needs 3/2 ·(log2 ui+log2 vi) multiplications in Fp. If we
consider that ui and vi are p/2 on average, then 3 log2 p−3 multiplications
are needed.
We can assume that on average, there are qj/2 iterations in the loop in i:
ki = qj/2. Thus Step 3.2 requires on average, for one j:
• 112 log2 |E|qj +
3qj
2 log2 p multiplications in Fp.
• 32 log2 |E|qj +
qj
2 inversions in Fp.
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= (s− 1) · log2 |E|.




















qj inversions in Fp.
• 11(s− 1)
2





Step 4.1 We use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute k mod |E|, knowing








and Rj = Q−1j mod qj . It requires 2s multiplications and s
inversions in (Fq1 , . . . ,Fqs).
Step 4.2 We can consider that on average, k mod |E| = |E|2 . Thus log2 |E|2 dou-
blings and 12 log2
|E|
2 additions on E are needed. Hence, Step 4.2 requires on
average:
• 112 (log2 |E| − 1) multiplications in Fp.• 32 (log2 |E| − 1) inversions in Fp.
4.4. Conclusion



















































We supposed that a > 0 and b > 0. If actually a < 0, we must add three inversions
in Fp and if b < 0, one inversion must be added. In the expressions above, many
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terms can be neglected. Moreover, the approximation log2 |E| ≈ log2 p can be done





























Since an inversion can in general be computed in a field of large prime charac-
teristic at a cost of at most 10 multiplications, and since a DH-inversion needs on
average 32 log2 p calls to the DH-oracle, we conclude
Theorem 2. Let G a cyclic finite group of prime order p. Assume an elliptic curve





Solving a given instance of the DLP in G requires on average about:















s− 1 + 9
4
(s− 1) log2 p
)





calls to the DH-oracle.
Using the Baby-Step/Giant-Step method to find k, as opposed to the exhaustive
search method above, both complexities can be replaced by
O
(√
B · (log p)3
)
.
5. Building a curve with appropriate order
We now turn to the problem of building a curve with a smooth group order over
the field of p elements. According to [4], the main techniques are:
• Generate random curves and compute their group orders, until an appropriate
one is found.
• Generate curves with given group order using the theory of complexity mul-
tiplication (CM).
The genesis of the efficient general point counting algorithms lies in the work of
Schoof [12]. The complexity of his algorithm is O(log8 p). To improve the compu-
tational efficiency of the basic Schoof algorithm, several techniques have evolved,
owing in large part to Atkin and Elkies, see [4] for details. The improvements to the
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basic Schoof algorithm are generally referred to as the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin (SEA)
algorithm, whose running time is O(log6 p).
When the order of the random elliptic curve is known, it remains to check whether
or not it is smooth.
To speed up the computations we preferred the CM method, since given a prime
p it is very easy to generate a large number of possible group orders. To this end, we
give a quick overview of the CM method for curve construction. If E is an elliptic
curve over Fp of order u, then
Z = 4p− (p+ 1− u)2
is positive by the Hasse bound. Thus there is a unique factorization:
Z = DV 2
where D is squarefree. So for each non-supersingular elliptic curve over Fp of order
u, there exists a unique squarefree integer D such that:
4p = W 2 +DV 2 (1)
for some W and V . In this case the group order is given by
u = p+ 1±W.
It is said that E has complex multiplication by D. The value D is called a CM
discriminant for p. To find W and V in equation (1) one uses the algorithm of
Cornacchia, see [4] for details.
Once one has found values of W and V , and an associated CM discriminant D
we can then build an elliptic curve with group order p + 1 ±W using the theory
of complex multiplication. This last step can lead to problems, unless the value of
D is sufficiently small, since for large values of D we need to construct the Hilbert
class polynomial which has degree hD = O(
√
D), where hD is the class number of
the order of discriminant −D.
Hence, we need to find a small value of D for a given prime p such that one of
p+ 1±W is smooth, where W is the solution to equation (1). The main cost is in
searching for a value of D such that p + 1 ±W is smooth. Due to the size of the
numbers involved a naive smoothness test is not enough, and essentially one needs
to perform a full factorization using the ECM factorization method.
6. Security of the DLP
The traditional way to interpret the reduction of the DLP to the DHP is to
use the result to examine the security of the discrete logarithm problem in terms
of oracle calls to the Diffie–Hellman problem. In such a situation one wishes to
balance the number of group operations and Diffie–Hellman oracle calls made in
the reduction algorithm. As we mentioned above this can be done by the use of
the Baby-Step/Giant-Step algorithm in Step 3 of the reduction above. Doing so
results in a complexity of O(
√
B · (log p)3) group operations and Diffie–Hellman
oracle calls.
Waterhouse [13] determined the possible values of #E(Fp) and showed that for
all integers d ∈ [p+ 1− 2√p, p+ 1 + 2√p], there exists an elliptic curve over Fp of
order d. Furthermore, a theorem by Ru¨ck [11] implies that the group structure can
10
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be assumed cyclic. This implies the following non-uniform reduction of the DLP
to the DHP. For a number p, we define ν(p) to be the minimum of the set of the
largest prime factors of the integers d in the interval [p + 1 − 2√p, p + 1 + 2√p].
This leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For every finite cyclic group G of order |G| = ∏ peii and such that
all multiple prime factors pi of |G| are smaller than a polynomial in log |G|, there
exists an algorithm that makes calls to a DH oracle for G and computes discrete
logarithms of elements of G in√
max{ν(pi)} · (log |G|)O(1)
group operations and calls to the Diffie–Hellman oracle.
A plausible smoothness assumption, see [9, 10], is that:
ν(n) is of order (log n)O(1) (2)
This assumption implies the existence of a (log n)O(1)-smooth cyclic elliptic curve
over Fp for each prime number p. Therefore for every cyclic group G there exists a
small piece of information, which depends only on the order of G, that makes break-
ing the Diffie-Hellman protocol and computing discrete logarithms polynomial-time
equivalent in G. This information is a string S consisting of the prime factors pi of
|G| and appropriate elliptic curve parameters ai and bi for all pi.
Corollary 1. If the smoothness assumption (2) is true, then for every cyclic group
G = 〈g〉 whose order contains no multiple prime factors greater than a polynomial
in log |G|, there exists a string S of length at most 3 log |G| such that when given
S, solving the DHP is polynomial-time equivalent to solving the DLP.
Using the specific properties of the elliptic curve groups defined in the various
standards, we now show the existence of an auxiliary elliptic curve which has very
smooth order, i.e. the order simply is a power of two.
Suppose first that the elliptic curve E is defined over a finite field F2n , then the
theorem of Hasse implies that #E ∈ [2n + 1 − 2n/2, 2n + 1 + 2n/2]. Furthermore,
all the elliptic curve groups in the standard have an order of the form #E = h · p
with p a large prime and the cofactor h either 2 or 4. This implies that the prime p
itself is contained in the interval
[2n−δ + 1/h− 2n/2−δ, 2n−δ + 1/h+ 2n/2−δ] (3)
with h = 2δ, i.e. δ = 1, 2. The theorem by Waterhouse showed that for each
d ∈ [p+1−2√p, p+1+2√p] there exists an elliptic curve over Fp with group order
d. Since p is contained in the interval (3), an easy calculation shows that it is highly
likely that d = 2n−δ is contained in the Hasse-interval [p + 1− 2√p, p+ 1 + 2√p].
This implies that there exists an auxiliary elliptic curve over Fp with group order
2n−δ. For all characteristic two curves in the SECG list [3] we find that the value
of d is in the required interval.
For elliptic curve groups defined over a large prime finite field Fq, this reasoning
no longer holds. However, to speed up computations, the primes q in use in the
standards are of a special form, in particular, most q are very close to a power of
2. Since the co-factor h is either 1 or 4, we conclude that #E = h · p with p close
11
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to 2n for some n. For all the curves over large primes fields to be found in [3] we
see that all of those of bit length greater than (or equal to) 160, bar secp256r1
have the property that p is sufficiently close to 2n for the reasoning to hold.
Knowing the existence of an auxiliary elliptic curve group with very smooth
order is however not useful in practice since it might require exponential time to
construct this elliptic curve. Hence, it is of interest for a given group, proposed for
use in a Diffie–Hellman protocol, to also present the best known string S which
produces the tightest possible reduction between the DHP and the DLP.
7. Security of the DHP
We now examine what the reduction means for the security of the Diffie–Hellman
protocol in the elliptic curve setting. We want to estimate the number of operations
an adversary to the Diffie–Hellman protocol would require, under the assumption




In this case we wish to minimize in the reduction the number of calls to the
Diffie–Hellman oracle, at the expense of increasing the number of group operations.
Hence, one uses the naive version of Step 3 in the reduction rather than the Baby-
Step/Giant-Step algorithm. This allows us to obtain a tighter security reduction.
For each elliptic curve in the SECG standards [3], which includes all the curves
in the NIST [2] and the most used ones in the ANSI [1] standards, we searched for
the best values for
• The discriminant D,
• The factorized order of the auxiliary elliptic curve (supposed to be smooth),
• The smoothness bound B,
• The parameters a and b of the elliptic curve,
• The number of group operations and the number of calls to the DH-oracle
required, using Theorem 2.
The various values for each curve are presented in the Appendix.
The Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results. The value of B is the size of the
largest prime factor of the order of the auxiliary curve, M represents the number
of field multiplications required by the reduction algorithm and DH is the number
of Diffie–Hellman oracle calls. The value T represents the tightness of the security
reduction. We do not give any values for the larger curves, since we were unable to
find a suitable D due to the difficulty of factoring integers of this size.
To interpret what these tables mean, we illustrate with an example. Consider
the curve secp256r1: with current knowledge it is believed that to solve the DLP
on this curve requires on average 2128 computational steps. This would imply, given
our auxillary curve, that the DHP could not be solved in 2108 steps and thus solving
the DHP on this curve is infeasible with todays computing technology. Thus we can
conclude that protocols which depend on the DHP for their security can be safely
deployed when using the curve secp256r1.
To obtain a tightness of the security reduction we need to look at two values.
There is the cost of field multiplications, represented by log2M in Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 1: Summary of results for curves of large prime characteristic
SECP curve D log2B log2M log2DH log2 TDH
SECP112R1 49271 24 32 18 38
SECP112R2 232 24 31 18 38
SECP128R1 1147 34 41 18 46
SECP128R2 1099 32 40 18 46
SECP160K1 615 29 36 20 60
SECP160R1 1687 33 41 18 62
SECP160R2 2947 46 53 19 61
SECP192K1 391443 37 44 20 76
SECP192R1 334852 38 46 19 77
SECP224K1 58531 53 62 19 93
SECP224R1 41187 42 51 20 92
SECP256K1 56296 56 65 20 108
SECP256R1 41752 53 62 20 108
SECP384R1 22312 83 91 22 170
SECP521R1 - - - - -






If we assume the existence of an algorithm to solve the DLP on E would take roughly√
#E steps then the value of TDH gives the minimum number of operations which
an algorithm to break the DHP would take, assuming M < TDH . Hence, it is the
value of TDH which gives the exact security result, given the witness curve we have
found. If one could find a better witness elliptic curve then one would obtain a
tighter security reduction, and hence a larger value of TDH .
Note that the value of DH is not really affected that much by the smoothness
value. The smoothness value mainly affects the number of group operations M . We
now argue that it is highly likely for auxiliary elliptic curves to exist which would
imply a tight reduction for all elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman problems.
Firstly note that since we are assuming an exponential algorithm for the discrete
logarithm problem and we are trying to reduce the number of oracle calls, we do not
mind if the number of group operations is exponential, as long as it is less than the
eventual estimated number of operations in the Diffie–Hellman algorithm. Hence, if
#E factors as a product of three primes of roughly the same order then we would
have that the reduction of Theorem 2 would require on average











(31 + 9 log2 p) log2 p
Diffie–Hellman oracle calls. In particular this would imply
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Table 2: Summary of results for curves of even characteristic
SECT curve D log2B log2M log2DH log2 TDH
SECT113R1 36883 27 34 18 38
SECT113R2 78859 22 30 18 38
SECT131R1 1348 40 47 18 47
SECT131R2 410107 32 40 18 47
SECT163K1 7 47 55 19 62
SECT163R1 384591 38 46 19 62
SECT163R2 6107 34 42 19 62
SECT193R1 7 48 57 19 77
SECT193R2 11 47 55 19 77
SECT233K1 7 41 50 20 96
SECT233R1 2263 69 77 20 96
SECT239K1 7 38 47 21 98
SECT283K1 7 30 38 22 119
SECT283R1 11768 61 69 20 121
SECT409K1 7 81 90 22 182
SECT409R1 - - - - -
SECT571K1 - - - - -
SECT571R1 - - - - -
Theorem 4. Assuming in the interval [p+ 1−√p, p+ 1 +√p] there is an integer
which is the product of three primes of roughly equal size, then there exists a string
S which implies that the best algorithm to solve the EC-DHP for an elliptic curve







All that remains is to estimate the probability that a number of size around p
is a product of three primes of roughly the same size. The number of primes of
size around p1/3 is roughly, by the prime number theorem, 3p1/3/ log p. Hence, the
number of integers of size about p which are the product of three primes of roughly




Hence, the probability is roughly 27/(log p)3. Since this is a polynomial sized prob-
ability on an exponentially sized interval one can conclude that a string as in the
above theorem must exist.
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Appendix A. Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp
Appendix A.1. SECP112R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 49271 of order r, for which the smoothness





r = 22 · 3 · 23 · 163 · 1063 · 1226387 · 1356227 · 6294503 · 8891461.
Appendix A.2. SECP112R2
Found an elliptic curve for D = 232 of order r, for which the smoothness bound









Found an elliptic curve for D = 1147 of order r, for which the smoothness bound





r = 52 · 37 · 892 · 937 · 116341 · 237781 · 182865533 · 9797974619.
Appendix A.4. SECP128R2
Found an elliptic curve for D = 1099 of order r, for which the smoothness bound





r = 22 · 57 · 103 · 325541 · 1901551 · 1497538799 · 2851021241.
Appendix A.5. SECP160K1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 615 of order r, for which the smoothness bound





r = 26 ·3 ·5 ·7 ·29 ·313 ·859 ·1693 ·1861 ·44371 ·227089 ·403681 ·7954649 ·273612893.
Appendix A.6. SECP160R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 1687 of order r, for which the smoothness bound





r = 24 · 321203 · 8923427 · 29516021 · 42625897 · 3481179073 · 7276295861.
Appendix A.7. SECP160R2
Found an elliptic curve for D = 2047 of order r, for which the smoothness bound









Found an elliptic curve for D = 391443 of order r, for which the smoothness





r = 7 · 11 · 13 · 1051 · 6793 · 37549 · 43133 · 2271419 · 5200957 · 11660993 · 47366447 ·
83112406499.
Appendix A.9. SECP192R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 334852 of order r, for which the smoothness





r = 26 · 2131 · 2184989 · 18476453 · 33606343 · 4164787607 · 54362974597 ·
149834064623.
Appendix A.10. SECP224R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 41187 of order r, for which the smoothness









r = 33 ·149 ·599 ·857 ·38299 ·83101 ·3691603 ·7802849 ·7620458239 ·3019441906903 ·
6188589965407.
Appendix A.11. SECP256K1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 56296 of order r, for which the smoothness











r = 27 · 52 · 59 · 46499 · 93151 · 94204592001827 · 4214180265645761 ·
5538146513558221 · 64401523664207893.
Appendix A.12. SECP256R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 41752 of order r, for which the smoothness









r = 22 · 32 · 12256103 · 15612089137 · 7289979571159 · 149179734594697 ·
1983840344370161 · 7791482602842641.
Appendix A.13. SECP384R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 22312 of order r, for which the smoothness









r = 2 · 139 · 19553 · 1717730921 · 9562711553 · 10066439953 · 298186652651 ·
2192234732221 · 8854959912191 · 1266378047297295563 ·
5980297858075074334711093.
Appendix B. Elliptic curve domain parameters over F2m
Appendix B.1. SECT113R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 36883 of order r, for which the smoothness









Found an elliptic curve for D = 78859 of order r, for which the smoothness





r = 5 · 23 · 379 · 1193 · 4691 · 6317 · 455237 · 2263879 · 3269753.
Appendix B.3. SECT131R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 1348 of order r, for which the smoothness bound





r = 2 · 11 · 95327 · 2175549221 · 43465878091 · 623951414393.
Appendix B.4. SECT131R2
Found an elliptic curve for D = 410107 of order r, for which the smoothness





r = 7 · 13 · 17 · 124904441 · 674468357 · 3166793159 · 3297994789.
Appendix B.5. SECT163K1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 7 of order r, for which the smoothness bound B





r = 23 · 7 · 37 · 109 · 127 · 1632 · 1621 · 2377 · 108217 · 166456142911 · 110524002744079.
Appendix B.6. SECT163R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 384591 of order r, for which the smoothness









Found an elliptic curve for D = 6107 of order r, for which the smoothness bound





r = 3 · 7 · 11 · 73 · 2969 · 5253529 · 31696801 · 45160931 · 1142969071 · 13584708629.
Appendix B.8. SECT193R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 7 of order r, for which the smoothness bound B





r = 22 · 16493 · 20357 · 307267 · 507697 · 2708335079 · 32535336276871 ·
340022400028151.
Appendix B.9. SECT193R2
Found an elliptic curve for D = 11 of order r, for which the smoothness bound





r = 3 ·991 ·4261 ·81349 ·2948267501 ·3798403579 ·5157510886093 ·105461115430301.
Appendix B.10. SECT233K1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 7 of order r, for which the smoothness bound B














Found an elliptic curve for D = 2263 of order r, for which the smoothness bound









r = 25 · 41 · 179 · 4421 · 12113 · 372709 · 5690131288087 · 684905249387674699 ·
377813292995836757497.
Appendix B.12. SECT283K1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 7 of order r, for which the smoothness bound B









r = 26 · 32 · 112 · 292 · 712 · 2812 · 491 · 541 · 631 · 1051 · 2017 · 7393 · 13721 ·
25621 · 58321 · 263201 · 8160041 · 34727701 · 70155401 · 590927681.
Appendix B.13. SECT283R1
Found an elliptic curve for D = 11768 of order r, for which the smoothness














Found an elliptic curve for D = 7 of order r, for which the smoothness bound B









r = 24 · 292 · 71 · 2843 · 5279 · 6323 · 8353 · 16067 · 42457 · 181281031 · 1159018351 ·
8896753517 · 37852407181 · 4860847115041 · 853621649145207671 ·
2179267320551430510798251.
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